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This study explores the impact of motivation, cognitive resources and difficulty of 
processing on social judgment. We hypothesized and found all three variables 
influence the type of information used to render judgment. Only when the 
information was easy to process, cognitive resources were ample and motivation was 
high were subjects able to use difficult information as a basis for their judgment.
Furthermore, contrary to the common notion that statistical information tends to be 
utilized when resources are high, we were able to show that subjects relied on 
statistical information when their motivation was low, the information was difficult to 
process and/or cognitive resources were limited. These results add to the growing 
body of evidence attesting that the contents of information as such do not affect the 
likelihood of their being made use of in judgment. Both base-rates and 
representativeness (“heuristic”) information seem to be used in accordance with their 
subjective relevance – when such relevance is discerned given that the individuals’ 
resources are sufficient to cope with the difficult posed by the cognitive task at hand.
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Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations for mean likelihood ratings p.17
1Chapter 1: Theoretical Rationale
In a world where information is readily available at the touch of a button, 
people are constantly surrounded by a wealth of information upon which to base their 
judgments. From decisions as seemingly small as which shampoo is best to major life 
decisions such as where to go to college, information abounds. Determining which 
information is most relevant to one’s judgment is of key importance in reaching a 
(subjectively) successful outcome. This paper argues that determining subjective 
relevance can only be accomplished when cognitive resources are available in order 
to appreciate the relevance of the information to one’s judgment. The following study 
explores the impact of motivation, difficulty of processing and cognitive resources on 
social judgments. 
The way in which humans make decisions about the world and the factors that 
affect those decisions has long been the focus of psychological research. At first, 
individuals were believed to make decisions in a rational, calculating manner, 
cognitively weighing information as would a good Bayesian theorist (Cohen, 1979, 
1981, Scott, 2000; Hastie & Dawes, 2001). This rational choice paradigm was 
challenged in the 1970s and 1980s by work showing that human’s were more limited 
in their cognitive capacity. The metaphor of humans as cognitive misers, taking 
shortcuts to minimize processing came into fashion. The capacity limited thinker 
searches for quick, easy solutions rather then making slower, more accurate
judgments (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). The study of judgmental heuristics, rules of 
thumb, came into popular use by the research of Kahneman and Tversky who showed 
2that human judgments were subject to an array of biases, fallacies, and the tendency 
to rely on “improper” evidence (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). 
Representativeness
One of these biases first identified by Tversky and Kahneman was related to 
the representativeness heuristic, reflecting the degree to which information about a 
target is similar to or fitting a given category. For example, a target, Steve, would be 
described as “very shy and withdrawn, invariably helpful, but with little interest in 
people or in the world of reality. A meek and tidy soul, he has a need for order and 
structure, and a passion for detail” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Individuals are far 
more likely to believe that Steve is a librarian then a physician, farmer or salesman. 
Individuals rely on their stereotypes in order to assess the likelihood that Steve is a 
member of a given category, in this case, a librarian.
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) argued certain information that should affect 
one’s judgments typically does not. In particular, the base-rates of an event are often 
ignored in making judgments about its likelihood. Thus, the fact that there are many 
more farmers then librarians should affect one’s judgment of Steve’s profession. 
However, presenting subjects with the frequencies of the various jobs within the 
population did not typically affect their use of the descriptive information. Instead,
individuals tended to evidence base-rate neglect.
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) studied this phenomenon directly by using 
their now famous lawyer-engineer problem. In the typical lawyer-engineer paradigm, 
subjects were told that in a group of people 30% were engineers and 70% were 
lawyers. They were then told that one man’s profile was selected at random and his 
3description included his hobbies: home carpentry, sailing and mathematical puzzles. 
Such information was referred to as “representative,” that is, indicative of the degree 
to which the specific case was similar to a generalizing category (of engineer, in this 
case). Subjects were then asked to estimate the likelihood that this target person is an 
engineer. From a normative standpoint one would expect that the base-rate 
information would be utilized. For instance, if the base-rate of engineers in a sample 
was said to be X (say 30%) participants would make a different likelihood judgment 
than if it was said to be Y (say 70%). However, Kahneman and Tversky (1973) found 
that subjects, regardless of which base-rates they saw, utilized the representativeness 
heuristic, that is, relied on the use of the individuating information, and, in the 
example above, overestimating the chance this person was an engineer. Kahneman 
and Tversky (1973) interpreted this tendency as erroneous and as reflecting people’s 
general insensitivity to statistical information and their preferential reliance on sub-
optimal heuristics.
Recently, Kahneman (2003) offered a general explanation of base-rate neglect 
and other similar phenomena in terms of a “dual- process” model whereby two 
systems of reasoning exist, one consisting of intuition and one consisting of 
reasoning. Intuition relies on fast, automatic, effortless, implicit and often emotional 
processing whereas reasoning relies on slower, serial, controlled, rule-based, effortful, 
deliberate, and consciously motivated processing (Kahneman, 2003). According to 
this view, errors or biases occur because, instead of using reasoning, people rely on 
intuitions when making judgments as the overall mental capacity of humans is 
limited. While part of the job of reasoning is to monitor intuitions, people are not very 
4good at this, especially when engaged in another task. When tasks are complex, 
people rely on heuristic principles which allow for simpler judgmental operations. 
However, these heuristics can also lead to biases and errors in judgments, as is the 
case in the representativeness heuristic responsible for base-rate neglect (Kahneman, 
2003). In the case of base-rate fallacy, the dual process model explains how 
individuals rely on a quick, easy assessment (of the individuating information) rather 
then on a more methodical, deliberate processing (of the statistical base- rate 
information).
Similar to other dual process models, (see Chaiken & Trope, 1999), 
Kahneman’s (2003) model assumes that when cognitive resources are limited, 
individuals will adopt shortcuts in thinking, relying on various heuristics to make 
judgments. On the other hand, when cognitive resources are plentiful, individuals can 
process information thoroughly and correctly. Unlike the cognitive miser view of the 
past, the updated theory of the motivated tactician believes that people’s judgments 
are influenced by motivations and emotions. “A fully engaged thinker… has multiple 
cognitive strategies available and chooses among them based on goals, motives, and 
needs. Sometimes the motivated tactician chooses wisely, in the interest of 
adaptability and accuracy, and sometimes the motivated tactician chooses defensively 
in the interest of speed or self-esteem” (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). From this perspective, 
one would expect that individuals whose resources are depleted or constrained will be 
especially likely to engage in intuitive thought whereas individuals who have a 
particular training to facilitate rational thought, e.g., training in statistics, should be 
particularly likely to give correct answers (Sedlemeier, 1999). This motivated 
5tactician perspective assumes a flexible process whereby the availability of 
motivational and cognitive resources may vary across individuals and across 
situations. In the absence of cognitive resources, individuals may be likely to engage 
in shortcuts and heuristics and in the presence of resources they may be more likely to 
engage in more extensive processing (Pierro, Mannetti, Kruglanski, & Sleeth-
Keppler, 2004).
Following the above logic, one can assume that different information would 
be of use to different individuals, depending on their prior knowledge. For example, 
for a statistician, the base-rates might have greater judgmental relevance then for 
other individuals. According to Khaneman, intuition can be powerful and accurate,
but the key determinant of intuitive thoughts is that “under appropriate circumstances, 
they come to mind spontaneously and effortlessly” (Khaneman, 2003 p.699). How 
then are we to understand intuition given the statistician for whom base-rates are 
intuitive, used spontaneously and effortlessly? Kahneman explains that the issue is 
one of accessibility, the ease (or effort) with which a particular construct is called to 
mind. This would suggest that effort is different than the content of information. 
However, Kahneman himself then says that, “the accessibility of a thought is 
determined jointly by the characteristics of the cognitive mechanisms that produce it 
and by the characteristics of the stimuli and events that evoke it” (Kahneman, 2003 
p.699). Thus, intuition refers to both the content of the information and the process by 
which that information is used. Returning to our statistician example, one can see that 
the content of information is the same but for the statistician the base-rates are 
intuitive and for everyone else, the base-rates require reasoning. This suggests that 
6content and effort may not be inexorably linked. By separating content from process, 
I will suggest that the degree of effort relative to task difficulty determines the impact 
of given information on the judgments rendered.
Evidence from Persuasion Research
Confusion over content and process can be found in other dual process models 
as well. Recent research on the dual process models of persuasion has found that 
upon the separation of content from ease of processing, it was processing difficulty 
(ease vs. difficulty of processing) rather then the type of information processed (cue 
vs. message argument) that had more impact on judgments. A review of the research 
in the area of persuasion has shown that heuristic cues are almost always presented 
briefly and upfront while message argument information is presented later and in a 
more complex manner (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999). The contents of the message 
(cue vs. message argument) were confounded with processing difficulty or task 
demand (complex vs. simple and order of presentation). Research in this area 
(Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a; Erb, Kruglanski, Chun, Pierro, Mannetti, & 
Spiegel, 2003; Pierro, Mannetti, Erb, Spiegel, & Kruglanski, 2005; Pierro et al., 2004)
has shown that when the content of the information remains the same but difficulty of 
information processing is varied, it is difficulty rather then content that determines 
judgmental impact. For example, when message argument information was presented 
briefly and upfront, hence it was easy to process, the information exerted more impact 
under low cognitive resources (mimicking the “heuristic” information of previous 
studies). When communicator expertise information (usually presented as a heuristic, 
7such as “experts are right”) was presented instead in a lengthy, hence difficult to 
process, manner, it exerted impact only under the high resource condition (mimicking 
the effects of “message argument” information). Thus, a separation of content from 
type of processing shows that it is not the content of the information (e.g., whether the
information is about the source or about the issue) but rather its processing difficult 
that interacts with cognitive and motivational resources to determine judgment. 
Evidence from Base-Rate Neglect Problems
Further evidence by Chun and Kruglanski (in press) using the paradigm of 
base-rate neglect shows that length of information and order of presentation 
(difficulty of processing) interact with processing resources to determine use. When 
the base-rate or individuating information is presented briefly and/or upfront, there is 
a greater tendency to rely on this information under limited cognitive resources then 
under ample cognitive resources. However, when the base-rate or individuating 
information is lengthy and/or presented late in the sequence, there is a greater 
tendency to rely on this information under high cognitive resources then under limited 
cognitive resources. It is of interest that in much of the prior research where base-rate 
neglect was demonstrated, the effect could have been due to the fact that the base-
rates were presented briefly and upfront, whereas the individuating 
(representativeness) information was presented lengthily and subsequently. 
Specifically, if participants had sufficient motivation and cognitive resources they 
might have been able to process the late-appearing information and, through a 
recency effect, might have assigned it greater weight in judgment. The fact that that 
utilization of easy to process base-rates is increased under load, as is the utilization of 
8representiveness information when it is presented in a easy to process form, belies the 
notion that people have a special difficulty in processing statistical information, and 
suggest that prior demonstrations of base-rate neglect may have stemmed from a 
confounding of informational type and processing ease.
Issue Involvement
Work in the area of persuasion has argued that non-directional motivation 
affects an individual’s willingness to process information. Under high motivation, 
individuals are motivated to spend time understanding and exploring an issue, while 
under low motivation, individuals are more likely to rely on heuristic information as 
the basis for judgments (Chaiken & Eagly 1976, 1983; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
Typically, these studies operationalize non-directional motivation as issue 
involvement (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981). Students who care deeply about an 
issue were typically assumed to be more highly motivated to process the information 
than students who were less issue-involved. According to our conception (see also 
Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999), motivation should be one of the factors that interacts 
with processing difficulty to affect the judgment process. 
The Present Research
The current research extends the findings of Chun and Kruglanski (in press) 
by exploring the interaction between motivation for processing information, difficulty 
of processing and availability of cognitive resources. First, previous conceptions of 
difficulty of processing (e.g., Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999; Chun & Kruglanski, in 
press) have used information that by its nature is more difficult to process such as 
9lengthy passages. Because length cannot be manipulated without adding 
informational content, this presents a difficulty when attempting to separate content 
from process. For that reason, the present study manipulated difficulty of processing 
by making the information difficult to read, using an italic font similar in color to the 
background. Furthermore, whereas Chun and Kruglanski’s (in press) analysis 
assumes that motivation was a factor that impacted the judgmental process, 
motivation was not manipulated directly in their research. According to the present 
analysis, motivation should interact with difficulty of processing such that if 
motivation is high, individuals will be interested in understanding and deciphering the 
information. In other words, individuals who are highly motivated will devote more 
cognitive resources in their attempts to understand the information. Thus, only those 
individuals with high motivation, easy processing task and available cognitive 
resources should be able to process complex, and hence, cognitively taxing 
information. 
In summary, I explored the separation of content from process within the 
base-rate paradigm. In prior literature on this topic (see e.g., Kahneman, 2003) base-
rate information was implicitly assumed to be more difficult to process with 
individuating information representing the “heuristic,” and hence easier to process, 
information. By contrast, we are assuming that difficulty of processing can be 
separated from type or content of information. Therefore, in the present study, 
information previously thought of as “heuristic” (i.e. individuating information) was 
presented in a difficult and challenging manner, requiring both resources and 
motivation for its processing. In contrast, base-rate information was made easy to 
10
process. Thus, we predicted that the individuating information would be used only in 
the presence of both high processing motivation and ample processing resources. In 
contrast, the base-rate information should be utilized when either cognitive or 
motivational resources or both are low.
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Chapter 2: Methodology
We provided subjects with information on an issue relevant to them – tuition 
increases – using a new version of the typical base-rate neglect paradigm. Subjects 
were given both base-rate information about the faculty’s views on this issue as well 
as individuating information about a particular faculty member. In our scenario, the 
individuating information was presented first but was presented in a rather difficult 
manner, requiring subjects to read and analyze the information. If subjects read the 
information thoroughly, they should conclude that Dan would support tuition 
increases. Base-rate information was presented more simply, with the percentages 
indicating that most of the faculty did not support the increase. Thus, the 
individuating information and the base-rates had opposite implications, with the 
individuating information being the more difficult to decipher. Cognitive load, 




University of Maryland students participated in the study in exchange for 
extra-credit in their psychology classes. A total of 110 students participated in the 
experiment. Data from 17 students were excluded as they recalled less than four digits 
in the load condition. Gilbert and Hixon (1991) suggested that recalling so few digits 
may represent a failure of the load manipulation, therefore, these students were 
excluded from the analysis. Five additional students were eliminated upon analyzing 
the data as their residual scores were greater then 2 standard deviations from the 
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mean. Total subject participation was 88 subjects consisting of 27 males and 61 
females. Gender differences were not found for any of the dependent variables and 
thus, will not be discussed further.
Procedure
Participants were told that we were conducting a study for the university on 
reactions to potential tuition increases. Students were then told that the tuition 
increases were intended specifically to “increase revenue for administrative support, 
campus parking, funding for graduate student research, and tuition remission for 
faculty children.” Participants were told that these domains had been overlooked in 
the past but were important for increasing the quality of education. This information 
was intended to convey that the tuition increases would benefit the faculty members 
and pilot testing showed that students did, in fact, believe that most faculty members 
would support the increase.
Individuating information was then provided about a particular faculty 
member, Dan. Students were told that Dan is a faculty member at Maryland and that 
he has children approaching college age. Pretesting showed that upon seeing this 
information, students believed that Dan would support tuition increases (average 
likelihood rating was 68%). However, the individuating information was relatively 
difficult to process as students needed to understand where the tuition money was 
going and to infer that Dan would benefit from that money.
Base-rate information was then presented about the faculty’s support of the 
tuition increase, ostensibly based on a survey we had previously conducted. Students 
were told that 70% of the faculty did not support the tuition increase while only 30% 
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supported the increase. This information was presented in a simple format and was 
the last thing that students read before answering the dependent variable, thus, 
making the information easy to process as compared to the individuating information.
Non-Directional Motivation. Manipulation of non-directional motivation was 
done via the supposed year of implementation of the tuition increases. In the high 
motivation condition, students were told that the tuition increase could take place next 
fall. Those in the low motivation condition were told that the increase was planned to 
take effect in five years, insuring the increases would not affect these particular 
students. Issue involvement was assumed to increase motivation such that if students 
believed there was a chance their own tuition would increase, they would be more 
motivated to process the information. Such manipulations have been used effectively 
in past research (e.g., see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).
Difficulty of Processing. A second variable, difficulty of reading the vignette 
was manipulated by using a font and a background color very similar to each other, 
making the paragraph extremely difficult to read. In the easy condition, subjects saw 
a purple background with black writing, the same as the rest of the slides in the study. 
In the hard condition, the vignette was written in italics and in a light purple ink on a 
purple background, making it rather difficult to read.
Cognitive Load. Participants were placed under high or low load. Participants 
under high load were told that a second goal of this study was to test how well people 
were able to concentrate on two tasks at once. To that end, subjects were presented 
with a seven digit number that they were asked to memorize and repeat while filling 
out the survey. Participants in the low load condition did not see this manipulation. 
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Prior to completing the dependent measure, participants were asked to reproduce the 
number.
Likelihood Estimate. The dependent variable was measuring by having 
subjects estimate the likelihood that Dan would support the tuition increases. 
Participants were asked to generate a response from 0% (no chance that Dan would 
support the increases) to 100% (Dan would absolutely support the increases).
Manipulation Checks. Following the likelihood estimates, participants were 
asked a number of questions about the study. To assess the load manipulation, 
participants were asked “how difficult was it for you to concentrate on the vignette” 
and “how distracted were you by other thoughts while reading the vignette.” Two 
items were used to assess participants difficulty of processing, “how difficult was it 
for you to read the vignette” and “how did the ink color affect your ability to read the 
vignette.” Results for all four questions were answered along a 7 point scale 
(endpoints: 1=not at all, 7=very much). 
Results
Manipulation Checks
Efficacy of Load Manipulation. Distraction ratings were analyzed to assess the 
efficacy of the load manipulation. The two questions assessing the load manipulation 
were highly correlated ( = .79). When combined, although only approaching 
significance, there was a main effect of load such that those under load experienced 
more distractions then those under no load, F (1, 88) = 2.29, p=.1. Because these 
results only approached significance, one-way ANOVAs were conducted on each of 
the items separately. The question “how distracted were you by other thoughts”
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showed that participants in the high load condition experienced more distracting 
thoughts (M=4.05) then those under no load (M=3.08), F (1, 87) = 4.60, p<.05. The 
second item, which asked participants “how difficult it was to concentrate,” was not
significant by itself but was in the predicted direction, with those in the load condition 
finding it more difficult to concentrate (M=3.29) then those in the no load condition 
(M=2.98), F (1, 87) = .47, p=.49. Taken together, these effects offer support for the 
notion that our load manipulation was effective.
Efficacy of the Difficulty Manipulation. The two items assessing the difficulty 
of processing were highly correlated ( = .7) and thus were averaged to form a new 
variable capturing the difficulty of reading the vignette. A one-way ANOVA showed 
a significant difference in the mean ratings between the easy and the difficult
conditions, F (1, 87) = 37.39, p<.00. As expected, participants in the difficult
condition (M = 4.49) found the vignette significantly more difficult to read then did
those in the easy condition (M = 2.07). Looking at each question separately, the 
results showed similar findings. When asked “how difficult was it to read,” 
participants in the easy condition found it less difficult (M=2.34) then those in the 
difficult condition (M=3.21), F (1, 87) = 3.29, p=.07. When asked “how the ink color 
affected their ability to read the vignette,” those in the difficult condition found the 
ink to have significantly affected their ability (M=5.77) as compared to those in the 
easy condition (M=1.80), F (1, 87) = 97.56, p<.000. These results attest that our 
manipulation of task difficulty was successful.
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Use of Base-Rates
A 2 (motivation) x 2 (load) x 2 (difficulty) ANOVA was performed on the 
participants’ likelihood estimates. An individual who relied on the base-rates, should 
predict that Dan would not support the tuition increase, thus, their likelihood 
estimation, should be higher then an individual who relied only on the individuating 
information. The analysis showed a main effect of motivation such that those who 
were highly motivated, used the base-rates less (M = 50.5) then those in the low 
motivation condition (M = 41.2), F (1, 87) = 4.94, p<.05. Although not significant, a 
main effect of difficulty approached significance in the right direction, with those in 
the easy condition, using the base-rates more (M = 42.7) then those in the difficult 
condition (M = 49.1), F (1, 87) = 2.35, p=.1. From these main effects, it can be 
concluded that since the base-rates were easier to process, only those with either the 
motivation or the ability to process information were able to use the individuating 
information to influence their judgment. 
Consistent with this logic, there was a significant two-way interaction 
between motivation and difficulty such that only those in the easy and high 
motivation conditions were able to use the more difficult individuating information, F 
(1, 87) = 4.55, p<.05. All the other conditions relied on the easy base-rate 
information. Most importantly, this interaction is qualified by a significant three-way 
interaction between motivation, difficulty and load, F (1, 87) = 4.15, p<.05, partial 2
= .05. Thus, under the difficult processing condition there was no interaction between 
motivation and load, but under easy processing, motivation and load interacted. Only 
the individuals in the easy processing, no load and high motivation condition were 
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able to rely on the difficult information whereas all the participants in the remaining
conditions relied on the easy base-rate information (see table 1). Planned contrasts
tested the means in order to explain this three-way interaction. As expected, those in 
the high motivation, easy processing and no load condition had significantly higher 
likelihood estimates then all other conditions, which did not differ among themselves.
Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations for mean likelihood ratings
Type of Processing Easy Difficult
High Motivation
No Load 67.69 (17.39) 40.00 (19.82)
Load 48.75 (19.59) 45.71 (18.13)
Low Motivation
No Load 38.11 (21.58) 45.38 (18.87)
Load 41.82 (17.22) 39.58 (19.82)
Note: Higher average likelihood estimates means greater dependence on the base 
rates.
To ascertain that our participants were indeed using the base-rates, we tested 
to see if any of the means was significantly different from 30%, the base-rate given 
for faculty who support the tuition increases. The only condition mean that was 
significantly different from 30% was the mean for the high motivation, easy 
processing and no load condition (t = 2.17, p<.05). None of the other condition means 
were significantly different then 30% (t < 1). These results show further evidence that 




The present research contributes to the understanding of factors that influence
the judgmental process. Conducted within the paradigm of base-rate neglect, the 
study manipulated non-directional motivation, difficulty of processing and cognitive 
load in order to examine their effects on the use of individuating and base-rate 
information. We found that all three variables are critical to the judgmental process. 
When motivation to process the information was low, and or the information was 
difficult to read, subjects did not pay attention to the difficult information but relied 
instead on the information that was easy to process. More importantly, the only 
condition in which subjects were able to process the difficult information was when 
they had high motivation, easy to read information and full available cognitive 
resources. 
In a typical lawyer-engineer problem, the content of the information and the 
type of processing was confounded such that one could not separate the effects of the 
difficulty of processing from the content of the information. Previous studies have 
shown that when this information is separated, difficulty of processing and 
participants’ cognitive capacity have the greatest impact on judgments (Chun & 
Kruglanski, in press). This study further extends this finding by using easy to process 
base-rate information and more difficult to process individuating information. Base-
rates were presented last in the sequence of information, making them accessible and 
easy to remember, while the individuating information was quite complex, requiring 
subjects to spend some time reading a number of paragraphs in order to infer the 
target’s views on the proposed tuition increase.
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The fact that in seven of the eight cells of our design participants did utilize 
the base-rates is contrary to the notion of general base-rate neglect (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1973). What may account for this discrepancy? First, because base-rates 
were presented last in the sequence of information they were highly accessible and 
easy to remember. In traditional base-rate studies, the individuating information is the 
last information seen, making it the more accessible information. In contrast, our 
individuating information required much greater processing effort on the part of the 
participant. Figuring out that the target person, Dan, had school age children and that 
tuition increases would benefit his finances, required motivation and resources. Thus, 
the individuating information was rendered more difficult to use while the base-rates 
were the easier to process so that under any of the constraints (low motivation, 
difficulty of reading, or cognitive load) subjects were inclined to use the base-rates 
rather then the individuating information.
The current study provides further evidence for the role that task difficulty and 
cognitive resources play in individuals’ tendency to utilize potentially relevant 
information toward the rendition of judgments. When processing resources are 
available, an individual will be able to process more complex and difficult 
information but when resources are limited, easier or more accessible information can
be utilized. Contrary to the implication that the use of base-rates represents a rational 
process, likely to occur under ample processing resources, whereas the use of 
individuating (or “representativeness”) information is likely to occur under limited 
processing resources, the present results show that where the base-rate information is 
easy to process, it is likely to be utilized under limited resources, and where the
20
representativeness information is difficult process, it is likely to be utilized under 
ample resources. Prior research has demonstrated that people’s subjective relevance 
of base-rates or “heuristic” information matters (Schwarz, Strack, Hilton, & Naderer, 
1991). Individuals would use the base-rates if they perceive them to be relevant to the 
judgment at hand. This study demonstrated that being able to appreciate the relevance 
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